Claims to Intermediated Financial Settlement Not Patent Eligible; Software Patents Still Alive

Alive_v_CLSBankThe U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Alice v. CLS Bank (June 19, 2014) touching on the patent-eligibility of software implemented inventions. The decision continues to allow patent protection for software innovation and technological solutions implemented with software. Therefore all software patents are not dead in the wake of this opinion, in fact, most survive under the USPTO’s interpretation.  However, this decision limits or eliminates, depending on the circumstances, the ability of one to obtain a patent covering a fundamental economic practice long prevalent in commerce that is merely implemented in a generic computer using generic functions without more.

The patents at issue in Alice were directed to using a computer to mitigate financial settlement risk, i.e., the risk that only one party to an agreed-upon financial exchange will satisfy its obligation. The court found that all of  the claims at issue are drawn to “the abstract idea of intermediated settlement, and that merely requiring generic computer implementation fail[ed] to transform the abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”

Mayo Framework
The court followed the two step framework presented in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U. S. ___ (2012), to determine whether the claims at issue were directed to an abstract idea. First, the Court determines whether the claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept (e.g. laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas). If so, the second step is to determine whether there are additional elements in the claims that transform the nature of the claims into a patent-eligible application of the law of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract idea at issue.

Software is Still Patentable
The court asserted that the claims at issue in Alice did not improve the function of the computer itself, nor effect an improvement in any other technology or technical field. So at least software that does either of those things should be patent eligible. Further, the court acknowledged that it must tread carefully so that the rules about abstract ideas or other excluded subject matter do not swallow all of patent law. This is true because at some level all inventions use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas. The court continued to recognize that the application of a law of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract idea to a new and useful end remains patent eligible.

Method Claims
The Court first looked at the method claims in Alice. In the first part of the Mayo framework, the court found that the method claims were directed to the abstract idea of intermediated settlement. The Court cited a 1896 publication discussing the use of a clearing-house as an intermediary to reduce settlement risk.

In the second part of the Mayo framework–whether there are additional elements–the court found that “the method claims, which merely require a generic computer implementation, fail to transform that abstract idea into a patent eligible invention.” The Court stated that the “wholly generic computer implementation is not generally the sort of ‘additional featur[e]’ that provides any practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract] idea itself.” The Court found that the method claims at issue did not do more than instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea of intermediated settlement on a generic computer.

The Court noted that the method claims did not improve the function of the computer itself, nor effect an improvement in any other technology or technical field. The Court found that all the computer steps were “well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry.” Further, the Court found that the ordered combination of the steps using a generic computer added nothing that was not already present when the steps were considered separately.

The Court found that the computer readable medium claims failed for the same reasons as the method claims and because Alice conceded that the computer readable medium claims raise and fall with the method claims.

System Claims
The systems claims fared no better than the method and medium claims. The Court discounted arguments that the system claims were not abstract because they included specific hardware configured to perform specific computerized functions (“… a data storage unit having stored therein information….”, “a computer, coupled to said data storage unit, that is configured to…”, “a communications controller”, etc). The Court found these items were “purely functional and generic.” The Court stated that “Nearly every computer will include a ‘communications controller’ and a ‘data storage unit’ capable of performing the basic calculation, storage, and transmission functions…” Therefore, the Court found that the hardware recited by the system claims did not offer “a meaningful limitation beyond generally linking the use of the method to a particular technological environment.”

The Court found that the system claims were no different from the method claims in substance. The court stated, “The method claims recite the abstract idea implemented on a generic computer; the system claims recite a handful of generic computer components configured to implement the same idea.” The court stated that to interpret the method claims as patent-ineligible, but then interpret the system claims as patent-eligible would go against the Court’s previous precedent that section 101 should not be interpreted in ways that make patent eligibility depend on the patent draftsman’s art (e.g. the manner in which the claims are drafted).

Analysis: Generic Computer
Some have argued that  Court has imported the question of novelty, usually reserved for consideration under section 102 and 103, into the 101 patent-eligibility analysis under the second question: “whether there are additional elements in the claims that transform the nature of the claims into a patent-eligible application.”

The argument is that under the second step we must ask: are the additional components of the claim beyond the abstract idea old and well known? Whether something is old or well known if usually a questions determined under sections 102 and 103 by looking to see if the claimed subject matter is disclosed in the prior art or legally obvious in view of the prior art.

At least one commentator suggests that the court did not import a novelty test into the section 101 analysis, but instead presented a question of whether the claim does significantly more than state a fundamental principle connected with an instruction to “apply it.” The court said, “Stating an abstract idea while adding the words ‘apply it”’ is not enough for patent eligibility. Nor is limiting the use of an abstract idea “‘to a particular technological environment.” The Court said, “Stating an abstract idea while adding the words ‘apply it with a computer’ simply combines those two steps, with the same deficient result.” Therefore the reference to a generic computer not being enough is simply a recognition that Alice’s claim did no more than apply a old principle in a generic computer.

While the court provides that a generic computer is not enough to transform an abstract principle into patent-eligible subject matter, another commentator  notes that the court does not provide much guidance on what is enough.

Not Abstract: Technological Solutions
As yet another commentator noted, the Court provided in Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) that a process of curing rubber using a well known mathematical equation was patent-eligible not because it involved a computer, but because the claimed process improved an existing technological process. Therefore, inventions directed at improving a technological problem should not be found to be abstract under section 101.

The question arises, what is a technological problem? At least the areas of applied economics and finance, such as intermediated settlement, which provide a non-technical method of organizing human activity are excluded from the meaning of technological.

USPTO Interprets Alice
On June 25, 2014, the USPTO issued a memo to its patent examiners instructing how to apply the ruling in Alice to pending patent applications. The memo instructs examiners to follow the two step Mayo analysis. The memo provides these examples of abstract ideas referenced in Alice under the first step of Mayo:

  • Fundamental economic practices
  • Certain methods of organizing human activities
  • An idea itself
  • Mathematical relationships/formulas

The memo instructs that inventions are not patent ineligible simply because the invention involves an abstract concept. The application of an abstract idea in a meaningful way is patent eligible.

If any of the above abstract ideas are found in the claims, the Examiner must proceed to the second step of Mayo to determine whether the claim is nonetheless patent eligible because it has additional elements that amount to significantly more than the abstract idea itself. Examples of limitations that may be enough to qualify as significantly more when recited in a claim with an abstract idea include:

  • Improvements to another technology or technical field
  • Improvements in the functioning of the computer itself
  • Meaningful limitations beyond generally linking the use of an abstract idea to a particular technological environment

The USPTO noted that limitations that are not enough to qualify as significantly more include:

  • Adding the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with an abstract idea, or mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer
  • Requiring no more than a generic computer to perform generic computer functions that are well-understood, routine, and conventional activities previously known to the industry.

Conclusion
While patent protection for software directed to fundamental principles of economics and finance without more is limited, patent eligibility for protecting software innovation and technological solutions implemented with software is still alive after Alice.

Risks of Waiting: Independent Invention & Google PageRank

InThePlexQuestions often arise about the risks of waiting. Waiting to get started, waiting to file a patent application, waiting to launch a product or service, etc. The risk is that someone else is independently working on the same problem or the same idea and beat you to the market or the patent office or both. What’s the chance of someone independently inventing in your space?  It is impossible to know for a particular circumstance, but we do know that independent invention around the same time happens. According to In The Plex: How Google Thinks, Works, and Shapes Our Lives, Larry Page of Google was not the only person in 1996 to recognized that the link structure of the internet was the basis for a powerful way to find information on the web. The resulting algorithm based on link information allowed Google’s search results to be much better than other search engines at the time it was introduced. Two others were working on this idea, but Google was the first to make it to market.

Adjacent Possible and Independent Invention
As Steve Johnson noted in his book Where Good Ideas Come From sometimes when a scientist or inventor comes up with a new idea or invention, they learn that one or more others have independently come up with the same invention at about the same time period, such as within a year. Johnson notes that this is because the invention becomes “an adjacent possible” once founding or necessary elements or parts are created, discovered, or otherwise available.

To demonstrate the idea of the adjacent possible, Johnson notes that if Youtube was created 10 years earlier in 1995 it would have failed. This is because in 1995 most web users were on slow dial-up connections and it could take an hour to download a standard Youtube clip. In 1995, Youtube’s innovation was not within the adjacent possible, but ten years later, with broadband internet and Adobe’s Flash technology, it was.

PageRank
As In the Plex explains, Larry Page realized you can estimate the importance of a web page by considering the web pages that link to it. Page called his resulting algorithm based on linking “PageRank.” Page said, “In a way, how good you are is determined by who links to you and who you link to you determine how good you are…”Both the number of links and the quality of the links mattered. If a respected web page linked to a page, that link would be worth more than a link from a less well-known or respected website.

In addition to considering the number and nature of links, the anchor text used for the link is considered. Early search engines would provide results based on the content of a particular page. Therefore the results to a search for “newspaper” might not include the most relevant results, such as the New York Times website, if the New York Times did not say “I’m a newspaper” or otherwise use the word “newspaper” on its website. This caused search engine results to be poor and allowed the best result to be buried under relevant results. If a web page used the word “newspaper” to link to the the New York Times web site, then newspaper is the anchor text. And if enough and/or important websites link using that anchor text, then search results for “newspaper” would include the New York Times website. Page’s algorithm ranked each web page based on the incoming links, anchor text, and other factors. The resulting ranking of each page was used to determine which search results were returned for a particular web query, which vastly improved the relevance of search results as compared with other search engines at the time.

Others Independently Discovered Linked Based Ranking
Jon Kleinberg, a postdoctroal fellow at IBM’s research center, discovered that the link text, e.g. what a linking page said when linking to anther site and how many pages linked to a particular site, was useful in determining the relevance of a particular page. While having the same core idea, Kleinberg and Page each approached it differently. Kleinberg wanted to understand network behavior, Page wanted to build something that helped people in searching the web. Kleinberg said “all sorts of IBM vice presidents were trooping through Almaden to look at demos of this thing and trying to think about what they could do with it.” But they couldn’t figure out what to do with it.

Another person,Yanhong (Robin) Li, in 1996 saw the link between the ranking of scientific papers based on the number of other papers that cited them and ranking web pages in the same way. He came up with a search method that calculated relevance from both the frequency of links and the content of anchor text, which he called RankDex. Li described this to his bosses at Dow Jones, but they didn’t do anything with it. Li said, “I tried to convince  them [Dow Jones] it was important, but their business had nothing to do with Internet search, so they didn’t care.”

Li first filed a patent application himself in June 1996 after reading a self-help patent book. But then Dow Jones hired a patent attorney and filed another application on the same invention in February 1997, which resulted in US Patent No. 5,920,859. A patent application for Page’s Page Rank system was filed January 1997, which resulted in U.S. Patent 6,285,999. As you can see, the patent application were filed within about a month of each other. Li left Down Jones and eventually started Baidu in 2000, which is now the largest Chinese search engine.

Conclusion
These three individuals, Page, Kleinberg, and Li, were each independently working, without knowledge of the others, on one of the most important developments in improving internet search results, and in turn, improving the utility of the web. While it may be possible that you can sit on your ideas for years without consequence, waiting carries the risk that someone else is independently working on the same problem or invention as you. The patent office, and sometimes the market, rewards first movers.

Method of Monetizing Copyrighted Content on the Internet Again Found Patent-eligible

Ultramercial v. Hulu and Wildtangent, Dkt No. 2010-1544 (Fed Cir. June 21, 2013)Fig1_USPAT7346545.

Ultramercial sued Hulu, YouTube, and Wildtangent Inc. alleging each infringed U.S. Patent 7,346,545. Hulu and YouTube were dismissed from the case. The trial court granted WildTangent’s motion to dismiss WildTangent from the case on the basis that the ’545 patent did not claim patent-eligible subject matter.

In the first round at the Federal Circuit, the court reversed finding the claimed method of monetizing copyrighted content on the Internet was a patent-eligible process. Then WildTangent appealed to U.S. Supreme Court and the Court vacated the Federal Circuit’s decision discussed below and remanded the case to the Federal Circuit to consider in light of Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U. S. ___ (2012). On remand from the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit again found that the claimed method of monetizing copyrighted content on the Internet was a patent-eligible process.

The method steps of claim 1 of the ‘545 patent are recited in my original post on this case.

Chief Judge Rader, J. O’Malley and J. Lourie comprised the panel in this case. All agreed that the ‘545 patent recited patent eligible subject matter. But J. Lourie wrote a concurring opinion suggesting that the analysis in this case should track that provided in the plurality opinion that he joined in CLS Bank International v. Alice Corp., __ F.3d __,  (Fed. Cir. May 10, 2013) (Lourie, Dyk, Prost, Reyna, & Wallach, JJ.,plurality opinion). It is quite surprising to suggest that the reasoning of a plurality opinion should be followed as binding precedent. C.J. Rader and J. O’Malley were supportive of a broad view of patent eligible subject matter in the CLS Bank case, whereas J. Lourie took a more narrow view–which is reflected in the opinions in this case.

Meaningful Limitations. The majority noted that assessing whether a claim was impermissably directed to an abstract idea involves a two step inquiry. The first is whether the claim involves an intangible abstract idea. And second, if so, then whether “meaningful limitations in the claim make it clear that the claim is not to the abstract idea itself, but to a non-routine and specific application of that idea.” When meaningful limitations narrow the scope of the claim so that the claims do not preempt all uses of the abstract concept, then the claim is less likely to be considered impermissably claiming an abstract idea. This is true because the application of an abstract idea can be patent eligible.

The majority noted that “with a claim tied to a computer in a specific way, such that the computer plays a meaningful role in
the performance of the claimed invention, it is as a matter of fact not likely to preempt virtually all uses of an underlying abstract idea, leaving the invention patent eligible.” It also noted that inventions with specific applications or improvements to technologies in the marketplace are not likely to be so abstract that they are not patent eligible. The court also noted that “unlike the Copyright Act which divides ideas from expression, the Patent Act covers and protects new and useful technical advance, including applied ideas.”

Wrenching the Meaning of Abstract. After reciting the 10 claims limitations from claim 8 of the ‘545 patent, the court concluded that “it wrenches meaning from the word [abstract] to label the claimed invention abstract.” The claim did not “cover the use of advertising as currency disassociated with any specific application of that activity.” The district court erred in stripping away the limitations and focusing on the asserted core of the invention. One of the claim steps included “providing said media product for sale on an Internet website” required a computer and the internet.

No Preemption of all Advertising. The court noted that the claims at issue here presented no risk of preempting all forms of advertising, let alone advertising on the internet.  Further the claims were not directed to purely mental steps because, in part, the claims require a controlled interaction with a customer over the Internet website.

Overly Detailed Claims Not Required. The court noted that the claims did not specify any particular mechanism–such as FTP, email, streaming–for delivering media content to the customer. Yet the court found this did not render the claimed subject matter impermissibly abstract.

Comment. Judges from both sides of the CLS Bank case agreed that the claims in this case were not impermissibly abstract. This is the correct result. When a computer and the internet are integral components to the claimed process, the process does not preempt all uses of the underlying idea, and the process cannot be performed mentally or on paper, the claim is generally not abstract.

Here it appears that the subject matter–serving advertisements over the internet–is an inherently technology based invention. In other words, it is not something that could be carried out in one’s mind or on paper. In contrast, the claim steps in CLS Bank were capable of being performed on paper, if not directly as mental steps. Therefore, claims directed to processes that are carried out with a computer, but could also be performed in ones mind or on paper, will have a harder time overcoming the abstractness challenges with the five member plurality in CLS Bank.

This case shows that inherently technology based inventions still have a reasonable chance of being claimed in a way that will be found patent eligible with members of the Federal Circuit that are more hostile to software patents. Nonetheless the outcome of patent eligibility challenges related to software based patents are still quite uncertain and dependent on the panel of judges that are assigned to a given case at the Federal Circuit.

 

 

 

 

CLS Bank v. Alice on Software Patentability: Can System Claims With Integral Tangible Components be Abstract?

CLS Bank v. Alice Corp., Dkt. No. 2011-1301 (Fed. Cir. May 10, 2013) (en banc).

Previously I noted that the USPTO told its Patent Examining Corps that the Federal Circuit’s decision in CLS Bank v. Alice, Dkt. No. 2011-1301 (Fed. Cir. May 10, 2013) resulted in “no change in examination procedure for evaluating subject matter eligibility.” In this post I will summarize the various opinions in CLS Bank.

The district court held that certain claims of Alice’s U.S. Patents 5,970,479 (the “’479 patent”), 6,912,510 (the “’510 patent”), 7,149,720 (the “’720 patent”), and 7,725,375 (the “’375 patent”) are invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent in-eligible subject matter.

Result without Agreement on Reasons. On May 10, 2013 the Federal Circuit issued its en banc opinion in CLS Bank v. Alice, Dkt. No. 201. The court’s main per curiam opinion provided, in total:

Upon consideration en banc, a majority of the court affirms the district court’s holding that the asserted method and computer-readable media claims are not directed to eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. An equally divided court affirms the district court’s holding that the asserted system claims are not directed to eligible subject matter under that statute.

 

The court was sharply divided across six separate concurring and dissenting opinions. A majority of the judges could not agree on the reason for the result. Therefore as noted by Judge Newman, the en banc review was hoped to provide certainty regarding the bounds of patentable subject matter by providing an objective standard, but this failed as a majority of the court could not agree on such a standard. As Newman stated regarding the CLS Bank opinion. “…we have propounded at least three incompatible standards, devoid of consensus, serving simply to add to the unreliability and cost of the system of patents as an inventive for innovation.” Newman Op. at 1-2. Therefore the result of future appeals in the area of software subject matter will depend on the random selection of the panel of judges hearing the particular appeal, unless the case is resolved by the Supreme Court or by a later en banc case at the Federal Circuit.

Summary By Opinion

  • Judges Lourie, Prost, Reyna, and Wallach. Judge Lourie would have invalidated Alice’s methods, computer-readable media, and systems claims as claiming patent ineligible subject matter.
  • Chief Judge Rader and Moore would invalidate Alice’s methods and computer-readable media claims, but upheld the system claims.
  • Judges Linn and O’Malley would have upheld all the claims as patent eligible.
  • Judge Newman would have upheld all the claims as patent eligible.

Summary by Claim Type

  • Method Claims:
    • Valid: Linn, O’Malley, and Newman
    • Invalid: Lourie, Dyk, Prost, Reyna, Wallach, Rader, and Moore
  • Computer-Readable Media Claims
    • Valid: Linn, O’Malley, and Newman
    • Invalid: Lourie, Dyk, Prost, Reyna, Wallach, Rader, and Moore
  • System Claims
    • Valid: Rader, Moore, Linn, O’Malley, and Newman
    • Invalid: Lourie, Dyk, Prost, Reyna, and Wallach

J. Lourie: All  Claims Not Patent-Eligible

Method claims. Claim 33 of the ‘479 patent was a representative method claim:

A method of exchanging obligations as between parties, each party holding a credit record and a debit record with an exchange institution, the credit records and debit records for exchange of predetermined obligations, the method comprising the steps of:

(a) creating a shadow credit record and a shadow debit record for each stakeholder party to be held independently by a supervisory institution from the exchange institutions;

(b) obtaining from each exchange institution a start-of-day balance for each shadow credit record and shadow debit record;

(c) for every transaction resulting in an exchange obligation, the supervisory institution adjusting each respective party’s shadow credit record or shadow debit record, allowing only these transactions that do not result in the value of the shadow debit record being less than the value of the shadow credit record at any time, each said adjustment taking place in chronological order; and

(d) at the end-of-day, the supervisory institution instructing ones of the exchange institutions to exchange credits or debits to the credit record and debit record of the respective parties in accordance with the adjustments of the said permitted transactions, the credits and debits being irrevocable, time invariant obligations placed on the exchange institutions.

J. Lourie, joined by J. Prost, Reyna, and Wallach,  found this claim describes the concept of reducing settlement risk by facilitating a trade through a third party, which is an abstract idea. Then the issue was whether the claim adds “significantly more” to the abstract idea. J. Lourie found that none of the limitations in the claim added anything of substance to the claim beyond the abstract idea.

J. Lourie found that the computer limitation (the parties agreed that claim 33 required a computer) was nothing more than an “insignficant post solution activity.” J. Lourie stated that “At its most basic, a computer is just a calculator capable of performing mental steps faster than a human could.”  J. Lourie continued, “Unless the claims require a computer to perform operations that are not merely accelerated calculations, a computer does not itself confer patent ability.”

Computer-Readable Medium Claims. Claim 39 is a representative computer-readable medium claim, partly reproduced below:

39. A computer program product comprising a computer readable storage medium having computer readable program code embodied in the medium for use by a party to exchange an obligation between a first party and a second party, the computer program product comprising:

program code for causing a computer to send a transaction from said first party relating to an exchange obligation arising from a currency exchange transaction between said first party and said second party; and

program code for causing a computer to allow viewing of information relating to processing, by a supervisory institution…

By looking passed “drafting formalities” J. Lourie found that claim 39 was not truly drawn to a specific computer readable medium, rather than the underling method of reducing settlement risk using a third party intermediary. Therefore, J. Lourie would find the medium claims ineligible.

System Claims. Claim 1 of the ‘720 patent is a representative of the contested system claims, partly reproduced below:

1. A data processing system to enable the exchange of an obligation between parties, the system comprising:

a data storage unit having stored therein information about a shadow credit record and shadow debit record for a party, independent from a credit record and debit record maintained by an exchange institution; and

a computer, coupled to said data storage unit, that is configured to (a) receive a transaction; (b) electronically adjust said shadow credit record and/or said shadow debit records…

J. Lourie asserted that the computer-based limitations recited in the system claims cannot support any meaningful distinction from the computer-based limitations that failed to supply an “inventive concept” to the related method claims. J. Lourie asserted that the system claims recited a handful of computer components in generic, functional terms that would encompass any device capable of performing the same ubiquitous calculations, storage, and connectivity functions required by the method claims.

J. Lourie stated that “No question should have arisen concerning the eligibility of claim to basic computer hardware under 101 when such devices were first invented.” The judge further stated, “But we are living and judging now . . . and have before us not the patent eligibility of specific types of computer or computer components, but computers that have routinely been adapted by software consisting of abstract ideas, and claimed as such, to do all sorts of tasks that formerly were performed by humans.”  Further the judge stated, “Abstract methods do not become patent-eligible machines by being clothed in computer language.”

Rader Opinion: System Claims Not Abstract

The opinion by C.J. Rader, J. Linn, Moore, O’Malley (the “Rader Opinion”), noted that “any claim can be stripped down, simplified, generalized, or paragraphed to remove all of its concrete limitations, until at its core, something that could be characterized as an abstract is revealed.” “Such an approach would ‘if carried to its extreme, make all inventions unpatentable because all inventions can be reduced to underlying principles of nature  which, once known, make their implementations obvious. ” Further, “A court cannot go hunting for abstractions by ignoring the concrete, palpable, tangible limitations of the invention the patentee actually claims.”

The Rader Opinion concluded that “where the claim is tied to a computer in such a way that the computer plays a meaningful role in the performance of the claimed invention, and the claim does not preempt virtually all uses of the underlying abstract idea, the claim is patent eligible.” The Rader Opinion found the system claims patent eligible noting that there were four separate structural components in the system claims: a computer, a first party device, a data storage unit, and a communications controller. The specification provided tat the core of the system hardware is a collection of data processing units” so that the structural and functional limitations were not mere conventional post-solution activities. The Rader Opinion concluded that labeling the claimed system an abstract concept “wrenches all meaning from those words, and turns a narrow exception into one which may swallow the expansive rule.

The Part VI of Rader Opinion joined by only J. Moore, found that the method and medium claims were not patent eligible.

J. Moore: The Death of Technology Patents Under J. Lourie’s View

J. Lourie’s view has broad negative implications for protecting software and technological inventions. As noted in Judge Moore’s opinion,  “If all of these claims, including the system claims are not patent-eligible, this case is the death of hundreds of thousands of patents, including all business method, financial system, and software patents as well as many computer implemented and telecommunications patents.” Moore noted that if all the claims at issue in CLS Bank were invalid then “so too are the 320,799 patents which were granted from 1998-2011 in the technology area ‘Electrical Computers, Digital Processing Systems, Information Security, Error/Fault Handling.'” In J. Moore’s view “if the reasoning of Judge Lourie’s opinion were adopted it would decimate the electronics and software industries.” Moore Op. at 2, note 1.

J. Moore noted that in In re Alappat, 33 F. 3d 1526, the court held patent-eligible a claim that would read on a general purpose computer programmed to carry out the operations recited in the claims. On page 8 and 9 of the slip opinion, J. Moore correctly noted that the distinction between hardware and software is not helpful as programs written in software could also be hard-programed in hardware. J. Moore stated software effectively “rewires a computer, making it a special purpose device capable of performing operations it was not previously able to perform.”

J.Moore noted that if the system claims in this case did not clear the 101 hurdle, “then the abstract idea exception will be insurmountable bar for innovators of software financial systems and business methods, as well as for those in the telecommunications field.” J. Moore stated:

“Every software patent makes a computer perform different functions–that is the purpose of software. Each Software program creates a special purpose machine, a machine which did not previously exists (assuming the software is novel). The machine ceases to be a general purpose computer when it is running the software. It does not, however, by virtue of the software it is running, become an abstract idea.”

J.Moore provided that the heavy lifting for considering the inventiveness of such systems claims directed at a computer running specific software is not abstractness under section 101 but rather is the novelty (newness) requirement of section 102 and the non-obviousness requirement of section 103. Section 102 and 103 can handle knocking out patents directed to inventions that merely take a known or abstract idea and put it on a computer.

 J. Linn’s Opinion: All Claims Patent Eligible under the District Court’s Construction

J. Linn and O’Malley (the Linn opinion) would have found all the method, medium, and system claims patent eligible. The J. Linn opinion noted that because of the procedural stage of the case, the parties and the trial court agreed that the claims should be construed in Alice’s favor and that the method and medium claims required a computer. Therefore the Linn Opinion would have found all the claims as construed by the district court to be patent eligible.

Further the Linn Opinion acknowledged the concerns expressed by Amici Curiae: Google, Dell, Facebook, Intuit, Rackspace, Red Hat, Zynga and Internet retailers regarding the proliferation and aggressive enforcement of low quality software patents.  However, J. Linn noted that Congress could make changes in the law, but broadening what is a narrow exception to the statutory definition of patent eligible should not be the vehicle to address the concerns through the courts.

J. Newman: Section 101 is a Course Filter – All Claims Patent Eligible

J. Newman would have found all claims patent eligible. Newman’s opinion set forth three principles: (1) section 101 is an inclusive statement of patent-eligible subject matter, (2) the form of the claim does not determine section 101 eligibility, and (3) experimental use of patented information is not barred.  Newman stated that there is no need for an all purpose definition of “abstractness” or “preemption” as was “heroically” attempted in the various opinions. Newman wants a very broad section 101 interpretation that would let the other provisions of the patent act do the work in determining patentability such as novelty, utility, prior art, obviousness, description enablement.

Conclusions

C.J. Rader, J. Linn, and J. Moore’s views are the best approach to section 101 patent eligible subject matter regarding system claims. When a claim includes computer or electronic elements that are more than mere post solution activities, those are specific tangible items that cannot reasonably be said to be “abstract.” As for J. Lourie’s opinion providing the view to get to the  gist of the claim, that is a slippery slope and there is no principled way to distinguish when to ignore tangible components of a claim to get to the gist of the underlying claim and when those tangible components should not be ignored.  Every claim term should be considered.

Further, J. Linn is correct that the concerns regarding low quality patents are not best remedied a broad judicially created “abstractness” exception that interprets system claims with integral tangible components as abstract. The issues regarding technology patents should be handled by Congress or through other patent requirements regarding novelty (102) and non-obviousness (103).  As noted in several opinions, every claim can be reduced to an abstract concept by stripping away the details and components. However, if such an approach is taken, the exception could expand to swallow the patentability of all inventions.

 Practice Tip

In view of this decision, patent applications directed to software or were the invention utilizes software should include at least one set of system claims because, of all the claim types of Alice patents, the system claims garnered the most support from judges regarding patent eligibility.

 

Real Estate Software Patent: User Action Steps Prevent Direct Infringement

US5032989Fig3Move, Inc. v. Real Estate Alliance Ltd., Dkt. No. 2012-1342 (Fed. Cir. March 4, 2013)

Move sought declaratory judgement of non-infringement of two of Real’s patents, U.S. 5,032,989 and U.S. 4,870,576. Real counterclaimed  that Move’s “Search by Map” and “Search by Zip Code” website functions infringed the patents. The district court issued summary judgement of non-infringement.

Claim 1 of the ‘989 patent was at issue on appeal and was directed to a method for locating real estate properties using a zoom enabled map on a computer. Claim 1 provided:

1. A method using a computer for locating available real estate properties comprising the steps of:

(a) creating a database of the available real estate properties;
(b) displaying a map of a desired geographic area;
(c) selecting a first area having boundaries within the geographic area;
(d) zooming in on the first area of the displayed map to about the boundaries of the first area to display a higher level of detail than the displayed map;
(e) displaying the first zoomed area;
(f) selecting a second area having boundaries within the first zoomed area;
(g) displaying the second area and a plurality of points within the second area, each point representing the appropriate geographic location of an available real estate property; and
(h) identifying available real estate properties within the database which are located within the second area.

Direct Infringement. In a prior appeal the Federal circuit determined that “selecting an area” as recited in steps (c) and (f) of claim 1 meant that “the user or a computer chooses an area having boundaries, not when the computer updates certain display variables to reflect the selected area.”

The Move system allowed the user to select a predefined area, such as a city, and the system would then zoom into the map according to the predefined boundaries of the area. The court found that the system did not “select an area having boundaries” by showing the predefined area after a user selected the area. Rather the computer just retrieved the map associated with the user’s choice. Therefore Move did not directly carry out the (c) and (f) steps of the claim.

Since Move did not directly carry out all of the steps, it must have direct or control over the performance of the missing steps by another party to be liable for direct infringement. The court found that it did not exert the required direction or control over its users to be liable for direct infringement.

Indirect infringement. The Federal Circuit found that the district court did not conduct the required analysis as to whether Move could be liable for inducing infringement by inducing its users to perform the claimed steps that Move did not itself perform.

Claim Language Suggestions. To allow for direct infringement, the claims could have been worded differently. Assuming the following was supported by the specification and permissible by the prior art, step (c) could have provided “receiving from a user a selection of a first area having boundaries within the geographic area” and step (f) could have provided “receiving from a user a selection of a second area having boundaries within the first zoomed area.” Such language might provide a better case for direct infringement.

[gview file=”http://www.waltmire.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/FedCir_Move_v_Real_2012-1342.pdf”]

Federal Circuit to Consider When A Computer-Implemented Invention Is Patentable

CLS Bank International v. Alice Corporation, No. 2011-1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Order granting en banc rehearing).

The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has granted an en banc rehearing in the CLS Bank case. As I previously discussed, the majority of a panel found CLS patents directed to using an intermediary in a financial transaction were valid and enforceable. The majority asserted that “when-after taking all the claim recitations into consideration-it is not manifestly evident that the claim is directed to a patent ineligible abstract idea, that claim must not be deemed for that reason to be inadequate under  § 101.” The dissent criticized the majority’s manifestly evident test.

The result in CLS Bank appeared to be in conflict with a prior panel’s decision in Bankcorp v. Sun Life, where a method of managing stable value protected life insurance policy was found not patent eligible.

The Federal Circuit will now rehear CLS Bank en banc, considering the following two questions:

1. What test should the court adopt to determine whether a computer-implemented invention is a patent ineligible “abstract idea”; and when, if ever, does the presence of a computer in a claim lend patent eligibility to an otherwise patent-ineligible idea?

2. In assessing patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 of a computer-implemented invention, should it matter whether the invention is claimed as a method, system, or storage medium; and should such claims at times be considered equivalent for § 101 purposes?

Method of Managing Stable Value Protected Life Insurance Policy Found Not Patentable

Bankcorp v. Sun Life, No. 2011-1467 (Fed. Cir. 2012) [PDF].

Bankcorp sued Sun alleging infringement of U.S. Patent 5,926,792 and 7,249,037. The patents are directed to methods and systems for administering and tracking the value of life insurance policies.  The district court found both patents invalid as claiming an unpatentable abstract idea under section 101. The Federal Circuit agreed.

Background: Life Insurance Policies. The claims are directed to dealing with a particular type of life insurance plan where the policy owner pays additional premiums beyond that required to fund the death benefit and specifies the type of investment assets in which the additional premiums are invested. This arrangement provide certain tax-advantages. However, the value of this type of policy will fluctuate with the market value of the underlying assets, which may pose an accounting problem for owners that must report the values of such policies on a quarterly basis. To address this fluctuation, a third-party guarantor is brought into the mix to guarantee a given minimum book value on the policy.  The patents are directed to methods and systems that use a formula for determining the values required to manage a stable value protected life insurance policy.

Representative claim 9 of the ‘792 patent provides:

9. A method for managing a life insurance policy on behalf of a policy holder, the method comprising the steps of:

generating a life insurance policy including a stable value protected investment with an initial value based on a value of underlying securities;

calculating fee units for members of a management group which manage the life insurance policy;

calculating surrender value protected in vestment credits for the life insurance policy;

determining an investment value and a value of the underlying securities for the current day;

calculating a policy value and a policy unit value for the current day;

storing the policy unit value for the current day; and

one of the steps of:

removing the fee units for members of the management group which manage the life insurance policy, and
accumulating fee units on behalf of the management group.

The ‘037 patent included claims that were substantially similar to claim 9 of the ‘792 patent. The ‘037 patent also contained system and computer readable medium claims that tracked the method claims.

Do The Claims Require a Computer? The Federal Circuit first determined that the system and computer medium claims required a computer. It also determined that the broadest method claims did not require a computer. The court noted that each method claim has a dependent claim that required that the method be “performed by a computer.” Under the doctrine of claim differentiation, “the presence of a dependent claim that adds a particular limitation raises a presumption that the limitation in question is not found in the independent claim.” Therefore, if a dependent claim required the method to be performed by a computer, then the doctrine of claim differentiation would lead one to the conclusion that the independent claim would not require a computer.

Claim Form Not Determinative: Look to Underlying Invention. The court asserted that it must look not just to the type of the claim but to the underlying invention for patent-eligibility purposes. The court found that the system and computer medium claims were no different from the asserted method claims for patent eligibility purposes.

Use of a Computer Also Not Determinative. The court stated, “To salvage an otherwise patent-ineligible process, a computer must be integral to the claimed invention, facilitating the process in a way that a person making calculations or computations could not.” The court found that the computer required for some of the claims of the Bankcorp patents were employed only for the computer’s most basic function, “the performance of repetitive calculations,  and as such does not impose meaningful limits on the scope of those claims.” The court continued to find there was no material difference between the claims invalidated by the Supreme Court in Bilski and the claims in the present case.  Further the court stated, using a computer to accelerate a patent ineligible mental process does not make that process patent-eligible.

Focus on Whether Inventive Aspects are Abstract. The court noted that when insignificant computer-based limitations are set aside from the claims, the question under section 101 reduces to an analysis of what additional features remain in the claims.  The court found that without the computer limitations nothing in the claims remained but the abstract idea of managing a stable value protected life insurance policy by performing calculations and manipulating the results.As a result the claims of the patents were invalid as directed to unpatentable subject matter.

Distinguishing CLS Bank v. Alice. The court distinguished its prior decision in CLS Bank International v. Alice Corporation, Dkt No. 2011-1301 (Fed Cir. July 9, 2012), because in CLS the court found that the computer limitations of the claims played a significant part in the performance of the invention.

New Manifestly Evident Test Maintains Broad View of Patent Eligible Subject Matter

CLS Bank International v. Alice Corporation, Dkt No. 2011-1301 (Fed Cir. July 9, 2012) [11-1301 Opinion]. 

CLS sued Alice for declaratory judgement that  U.S. Patent No. 5,970,479, 6,912,510, 7,149,720, and 7,725,375 owned by Alice were invalid, unenforceable, or otherwise not infringed. The district court held that each of Alice’ s patents were invalid under section 101 for failure to claim patent eligible subject matter. The Federal Circuit reversed maintaining a broad view of patentable subject matter.

Representative Claim 33 of the ‘497 patent provides: A method of exchanging obligations as between parties, each party holding a credit record and a debit record with an exchange institution, the credit records and debit records for exchange of predetermined obligations, the method comprising the steps of:

(a) creating a shadow credit record and a shadow debit record for each stakeholder party to be held independently by a supervisory institution from the exchange institutions;

(b) obtaining from each exchange institution a start-of-day balance for each shadow credit record and shadow debit record;

(c) for every transaction resulting in an exchange obligation, the supervisory institution adjusting each respective party’s shadow credit record or shadow debit record, allowing only these [sic] transactions that do not result in the value of the shadow debit record being less than the value of the shadow credit record at any time, each said adjustment taking place in chronological order; and

(d) at the end-of-day, the supervisory institution instructing one of the exchange institutions to exchange credits or debits to the credit record and debit record of the respective parties in accordance with the adjustments of the said permitted transactions, the credits and debits being irrevocable, time invariant obligations placed on the exchange institutions.

Manifestly Evident Test.The Federal Circuit found that the district court took too narrow a view of patent eligible subject matter . The Federal Circuit introduced a new manifestly evident test which provides, “when–after taking all the claim recitations into consideration–t is not manifestly evident that the claim is directed to a patent ineligible abstract idea, that claim must not be deemed for that reason to be inadequate under  § 101.” The court continued, “It would undermine the intent of Congress to extend a judicially-crafted exception to the unqualified statutory eligibility criteria of § 101 beyond that which is ‘implicitly’ excluded as a ‘fundamental truth’ that is ‘free to all mend and reserved exclusively to none.’ ” (citing Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010)).  The court further stated that “Unless the single most reasonable understanding is that a claim is directed to nothing more than a fundamental truth or disembodied concept, with no limitations in the claim attaching the idea to a specific application, it is inappropriate to hold the claim is directed to patent ineligible ‘abstract idea’ under 35 U.S.C. § 101.”

The Federal Circuit found that the claims of the ‘720 and the ‘375 Patents each had explicit machine limitations. ’720 Patent col.65 ll.42- 48 (“A data processing system . . . comprising a data  storage unit . . . ; and a computer . . . .”); ’375 Patent col.68 ll.5-7 (“A computer program product comprising a computer readable storage medium having computer readable program code embodied in the medium . . . .”). The court found these machine limitations could not be ignored and they were not “insignificant post solution activity.”

Electronic Adjustment Implicates a Machine. Regarding the method claims of the ‘510 patent, the Federal Circuit found that they each provided an “electronic adjustment” limitation, which implicated a machine under the machine-or-transformation test.  The court noted that the CLS agreed that the electronic adjustment required a computer, which was consistent with the patent specification.

Shadow Credit Record Implicates a Machine. Regarding the method claim of the ‘479 patent recited above, the court noted that the claims did not have the “electronic adjustment” limitation, but the claims did contain a “shadow credit record” and a “shadow debit record”, which when read in light of the specification, required a computer implementation. As a result the “shadow credit record” and “shadow debit record” where sufficient to implicate a machine under the machine under the machine-or-transformation test.

The court acknowledged that the mere fact of a computer implementation alone does not resolve the patent eligibility question. The court stated that it was not computer implementation, but the claims as a whole that make the invention patentable.

Dissent. Judge Prost criticized the majority’s manifestly evident test. The dissent asserted that the claims were merely directed to the basic idea of using an intermediary in a financial transaction, which the dissent noted existed since the Early Roman Empire. The dissent asserted that the representative claim 33 of the ‘479 patent involves four simple steps: (a) creating a debit and credit account for each party, (b) checking  the account balances in the morning, (c) adjusting the account balances through the day, and (d) paying the parties at the end of the day if both parties have performed. The dissent dismissed any patentable significance being attached to “shadow records.” The dissent asserted that shadow records are simply used to define an account that is used to ptrack a party’s payments and that any financial intermediation would do this.

The Dissent further noted that the invention is focused on the financial transaction and not the computer implementation. The dissent noted that the ‘disclosure of the invention” section of  the ‘720 Patent almost exclusively discusses the concept of risk minimization in financial transactions. There are no statements that the computer implementation is an advancement in the art and instead provides that the object of the invention can be “achieved by a computing/telecommunications infrastructure that is capable of being accessed worldwide by any enterprise/individual having access to a computer and a telephone network.” The dissent asserts that the rest of the specification is devoid of any teaching for how one implements computer systems.

Focus on Whether Inventive Aspects are Abstract. The Dissent asserts that “we must look beyond the non-inventive aspects of the claims and ask whether the remaining portion is and abstract idea.”

MySpace and Craigslist Invalidate Patents on Database with User Creatable and Categorizable Entries

MySpace, Inc. v. Graphon Corp., Dkt. No. 2011-1149 (Fed. Cir. March 2, 2012).

MySpace and Craigslist sued Graphon for declaratory judgement of non-infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 6,324,538, 6,850,940, 7,028,034, and 7,269,591 (patents in suit). Graphon counterclaimed for patent infringement. The district court found the claims at issue in the patents in suit were invalid as either anticipated or obvious based upon a system called the Mother of all Bulletin Boards (MBB) and the Federal Circuit agreed.

User Manipulable Database Entries. The patents in suit were directed to a method and apparatus that allowed a user to create, modify, and search for a database record over a computer network. The inventors of the patents in suit claimed the prior systems, like Yahoo! directory, provided that the search engine operator rather than the users would categorize website listings. Under this system of categorization, the categorizer would miscategorize entries without user input. The inventors attempted to overcome this problem by allowing users to create and edit one or more database entries with their own text and graphics and then to create for each entry searchable categories that best matched the information in each entry.

Prior Art. Before the earliest priority date of the patents in suit, the Mother of all Bulletin Boards (MBB) was developed at the University of Colorado. The MBB allows the creation of an Internet catalogue that grew through user input without intervention from an administrator. The data in the MBB system was stored hierarchically as apposed to relationally (e.g. a relational database).

“Database” Includes Hierachical and Relational. The Federal Circuit found that the disputed claim term “database” included both hierachical and relational databases in the patents in suit. Therefore, the MBB’s use of a hieracrchical system met the claim term “database” and therefore resulted in the invalidity of the subject claims of the patents in suit. The court noted that the term “database” is generally understood to include different types of data organization systems, including hierarchical and relational systems. The court rejected Graphon’s argument that the written description and the prosecution history of the patents in suit indicate that the term database should be limited to relational database. If the term was so limited, the MBB would likely not invalid the patents in suit. The court found that the written description described features contained in multiple types of databases and therefore the term database could not be limited to relational databases.

Written Description & Reading in Limitations. The court explain that two principles on claim construction were complementary rather than competing. The first principle is that the written description is the best source for understanding the technical meaning of a claim. The second principle is that limitation from the written description cannot be read into the claims absent a clear intention by the patentee. The court explained that there are two limiting factors during claim construction–what was invented and what was claimed. A patentee can claim less than was invented, but never more than was invented. The court directed that we look to the entire patent to determine what was invented. Yet to determine what was claimed, the precise words of a claim are to be reviewed and the written description is used as an aid in understanding those words.

Address Patentable Subject Matter First? The dissent argued that before considering whether the patents in suit were invalid as obvious or anticipated, the court had a duty in the first case to determine whether the patents claimed patentable subject matter under section 101, even if the issue was not raised by the parties or the trial court. The majority rejected this approach. The majority noted the difficulty that courts had in defining the bounds of patentable subject matter. The majority stated that validity determinations under section 102, 103, 112 (anticipation, obviousness, and enablement) are the best approach to resolving most cases. These approaches avoid the search for universal truths that may be necessary when searching the bounds patentable subject matter under section 101. However, the court did not say that section 101 could never be raised first in a patent suit. Yet in first looking to sections 102, 103, and 112, the court said that questions of patent validity could be concluded in many cases without wading into the “murky morass that is section 101 jurisprudence.”

Method of Monetizing Copyrighted Content on Internet is Patent-Eligible

Ultramercial v. Hulu and Wildtangent, Dkt. No. 2010-1544 (Fed. Cir. Sept 15, 2011) [PDF].

Update: WildTangent appealed to U.S. Supreme Court and The Court vacated the Federal Circuit’s decision discussed below and remanded the case the Federal Circuit to consider in light of Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U. S. ___ (2012).

Second Update: On remand from the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit again found that the claimed method of monetizing copyrighted content on the Internet was a patent-eligible process.

Ultramercial sued Hulu, YouTube, and Wildtangent Inc. alleging each infringed U.S. Patent 7,346,545. Hulu and YouTube were dismissed from the case. The trial court granted WildTangent’s motion to dismiss WildTangent from the case on the basis that the ‘545 patent did not claim patent-eligible subject matter. The Federal Circuit reversed finding the claimed method of monetizing copyrighted content on the Internet was a patent-eligible process.

The ‘545 patent claims a method for distributing copyrighted products over the Internet where a consumer receives a copyrighted product for free after viewing an advertisement. The advertiser pays for the copyrighted content. Claim 1 of the ‘545 patent provides:

A method for distribution of products over the Internet via a facilitator, said method comprising the steps of:

a first step of receiving, from a content provider, media products that are covered by intellectual-property rights protection and are available for purchase, wherein each said media product being comprised of at least one of text data, music data, and video data;

a second step of selecting a sponsor message to be associated with the media product, said sponsor message being selected from a plurality of sponsor messages, said second step including accessing an activity log to verify that the total number of times which the sponsor message has been previously presented is less than the number of transaction cycles contracted by the sponsor of the sponsor message;

a third step of providing the media product for sale at an Internet website;

a fourth step of restricting general public access to said media product;

a fifth step of offering to a consumer access to the media product without charge to the consumer on the precondition that the consumer views the sponsor message;

a sixth step of receiving from the consumer a request to view the sponsor message, wherein the consumer submits said request in response to being offered access to the media product;

a seventh step of, in response to receiving the request from the consumer, facilitating the display of a sponsor message to the consumer;

an eighth step of, if the sponsor message is not an interactive message, allowing said consumer access to said media product after said step of facilitating the display of said sponsor message;

a ninth step of, if the sponsor message is an interactive message, presenting at least one query to the consumer and allowing said consumer access to said media product after receiving a response to said at least one query;

a tenth step of recording the transaction event to the activity log, said tenth step including updating the total number of times the sponsor message has been presented; and

an eleventh step of receiving payment from the sponsor of the sponsor message displayed.

Patent-Eligible Subject Matter. Section 101 of the Patent Act provides that any new process, machine, article of manufacture, and composition of matter is patent eligible subject matter. Three areas excluded from patent eligibility are laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas. The Supreme Court has previously stated that a process under section 101 can include a business method. Further, while abstract principles are not patentable, an application of an abstract idea may be patentable.

Monetizing Content via Internet was a “Process” under the Statute. The Federal Circuit court found that the claimed method of monetizing and distributing copyrighted products over the Internet was a “process” under the patent statute and was therefore patent-eligible subject matter. The court turned its focus on whether the claimed subject matter was not patent eligible as being and abstract idea.

The Claimed Process was Not An Abstract Idea. The court stated, “[I]nventions with specific applications or improvements to technologies in the marketplace are not likely to be so abstract that they override the statutory language and framework of the Patent Act.” The court found that the ‘545 patent sought to fix the problem of declining click-through rates of banner advertising by introducing a method of distribution that caused consumers to view advertisements before granting access to the desired media such as video.

The court found that the claimed invention of the ‘545 patent was an application of an idea and not an abstract idea itself. The court termed the abstract idea as the idea that advertising can be used as a form of currency. Then the court noted that the patent disclosed a practical application of this idea. The court supported its conclusion by noting that the steps of the method are “likely to require intricate and complex computer programming” and that certain steps “require specific application to the Internet and a cyber-market environment” such as “providing said media products for sale on an Internet website.” It further noted that the invention would involve a “extensive computer interface.”

The court noted that the fact that the ‘545 patent did not specify a particular way (e.g. FTP, email, streaming) for delivering the media content to the consumer did not render the claimed subject matter impermissibly abstract. In addition, as the claim provided a controlled interaction via a website with a customer, the claim did not comprise only purely mental steps.

No Bright Line Rule. However, the court refused to specify a minimum level of programming complexity required so that a computer-implemented method is patent-eligible. Further, the court cautioned that not every use of an Internet website in a method will be sufficient alone to find that method patent-eligible.