Tag: method claims

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Method of Monetizing Copyrighted Content on the Internet Again Found Patent-eligible

Ultramercial v. Hulu and Wildtangent, Dkt No. 2010-1544 (Fed Cir. June 21, 2013)Fig1_USPAT7346545.

Ultramercial sued Hulu, YouTube, and Wildtangent Inc. alleging each infringed U.S. Patent 7,346,545. Hulu and YouTube were dismissed from the case. The trial court granted WildTangent’s motion to dismiss WildTangent from the case on the basis that the ’545 patent did not claim patent-eligible subject matter.

In the first round at the Federal Circuit, the court reversed finding the claimed method of monetizing copyrighted content on the Internet was a patent-eligible process. Then WildTangent appealed to U.S. Supreme Court and the Court vacated the Federal Circuit’s decision discussed below and remanded the case to the Federal Circuit to consider in light of Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U. S. ___ (2012). On remand from the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit again found that the claimed method of monetizing copyrighted content on the Internet was a patent-eligible process.

The method steps of claim 1 of the ‘545 patent are recited in my original post on this case.

Chief Judge Rader, J. O’Malley and J. Lourie comprised the panel in this case. All agreed that the ‘545 patent recited patent eligible subject matter. But J. Lourie wrote a concurring opinion suggesting that the analysis in this case should track that provided in the plurality opinion that he joined in CLS Bank International v. Alice Corp., __ F.3d __,  (Fed. Cir. May 10, 2013) (Lourie, Dyk, Prost, Reyna, & Wallach, JJ.,plurality opinion). It is quite surprising to suggest that the reasoning of a plurality opinion should be followed as binding precedent. C.J. Rader and J. O’Malley were supportive of a broad view of patent eligible subject matter in the CLS Bank case, whereas J. Lourie took a more narrow view–which is reflected in the opinions in this case.

Meaningful Limitations. The majority noted that assessing whether a claim was impermissably directed to an abstract idea involves a two step inquiry. The first is whether the claim involves an intangible abstract idea. And second, if so, then whether “meaningful limitations in the claim make it clear that the claim is not to the abstract idea itself, but to a non-routine and specific application of that idea.” When meaningful limitations narrow the scope of the claim so that the claims do not preempt all uses of the abstract concept, then the claim is less likely to be considered impermissably claiming an abstract idea. This is true because the application of an abstract idea can be patent eligible.

The majority noted that “with a claim tied to a computer in a specific way, such that the computer plays a meaningful role in
the performance of the claimed invention, it is as a matter of fact not likely to preempt virtually all uses of an underlying abstract idea, leaving the invention patent eligible.” It also noted that inventions with specific applications or improvements to technologies in the marketplace are not likely to be so abstract that they are not patent eligible. The court also noted that “unlike the Copyright Act which divides ideas from expression, the Patent Act covers and protects new and useful technical advance, including applied ideas.”

Wrenching the Meaning of Abstract. After reciting the 10 claims limitations from claim 8 of the ‘545 patent, the court concluded that “it wrenches meaning from the word [abstract] to label the claimed invention abstract.” The claim did not “cover the use of advertising as currency disassociated with any specific application of that activity.” The district court erred in stripping away the limitations and focusing on the asserted core of the invention. One of the claim steps included “providing said media product for sale on an Internet website” required a computer and the internet.

No Preemption of all Advertising. The court noted that the claims at issue here presented no risk of preempting all forms of advertising, let alone advertising on the internet.  Further the claims were not directed to purely mental steps because, in part, the claims require a controlled interaction with a customer over the Internet website.

Overly Detailed Claims Not Required. The court noted that the claims did not specify any particular mechanism–such as FTP, email, streaming–for delivering media content to the customer. Yet the court found this did not render the claimed subject matter impermissibly abstract.

Comment. Judges from both sides of the CLS Bank case agreed that the claims in this case were not impermissibly abstract. This is the correct result. When a computer and the internet are integral components to the claimed process, the process does not preempt all uses of the underlying idea, and the process cannot be performed mentally or on paper, the claim is generally not abstract.

Here it appears that the subject matter–serving advertisements over the internet–is an inherently technology based invention. In other words, it is not something that could be carried out in one’s mind or on paper. In contrast, the claim steps in CLS Bank were capable of being performed on paper, if not directly as mental steps. Therefore, claims directed to processes that are carried out with a computer, but could also be performed in ones mind or on paper, will have a harder time overcoming the abstractness challenges with the five member plurality in CLS Bank.

This case shows that inherently technology based inventions still have a reasonable chance of being claimed in a way that will be found patent eligible with members of the Federal Circuit that are more hostile to software patents. Nonetheless the outcome of patent eligibility challenges related to software based patents are still quite uncertain and dependent on the panel of judges that are assigned to a given case at the Federal Circuit.

 

 

 

 

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CLS Bank v. Alice on Software Patentability: Can System Claims With Integral Tangible Components be Abstract?

CLS Bank v. Alice Corp., Dkt. No. 2011-1301 (Fed. Cir. May 10, 2013) (en banc).

Previously I noted that the USPTO told its Patent Examining Corps that the Federal Circuit’s decision in CLS Bank v. Alice, Dkt. No. 2011-1301 (Fed. Cir. May 10, 2013) resulted in “no change in examination procedure for evaluating subject matter eligibility.” In this post I will summarize the various opinions in CLS Bank.

The district court held that certain claims of Alice’s U.S. Patents 5,970,479 (the “’479 patent”), 6,912,510 (the “’510 patent”), 7,149,720 (the “’720 patent”), and 7,725,375 (the “’375 patent”) are invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent in-eligible subject matter.

Result without Agreement on Reasons. On May 10, 2013 the Federal Circuit issued its en banc opinion in CLS Bank v. Alice, Dkt. No. 201. The court’s main per curiam opinion provided, in total:

Upon consideration en banc, a majority of the court affirms the district court’s holding that the asserted method and computer-readable media claims are not directed to eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. An equally divided court affirms the district court’s holding that the asserted system claims are not directed to eligible subject matter under that statute.

 

The court was sharply divided across six separate concurring and dissenting opinions. A majority of the judges could not agree on the reason for the result. Therefore as noted by Judge Newman, the en banc review was hoped to provide certainty regarding the bounds of patentable subject matter by providing an objective standard, but this failed as a majority of the court could not agree on such a standard. As Newman stated regarding the CLS Bank opinion. “…we have propounded at least three incompatible standards, devoid of consensus, serving simply to add to the unreliability and cost of the system of patents as an inventive for innovation.” Newman Op. at 1-2. Therefore the result of future appeals in the area of software subject matter will depend on the random selection of the panel of judges hearing the particular appeal, unless the case is resolved by the Supreme Court or by a later en banc case at the Federal Circuit.

Summary By Opinion

  • Judges Lourie, Prost, Reyna, and Wallach. Judge Lourie would have invalidated Alice’s methods, computer-readable media, and systems claims as claiming patent ineligible subject matter.
  • Chief Judge Rader and Moore would invalidate Alice’s methods and computer-readable media claims, but upheld the system claims.
  • Judges Linn and O’Malley would have upheld all the claims as patent eligible.
  • Judge Newman would have upheld all the claims as patent eligible.

Summary by Claim Type

  • Method Claims:
    • Valid: Linn, O’Malley, and Newman
    • Invalid: Lourie, Dyk, Prost, Reyna, Wallach, Rader, and Moore
  • Computer-Readable Media Claims
    • Valid: Linn, O’Malley, and Newman
    • Invalid: Lourie, Dyk, Prost, Reyna, Wallach, Rader, and Moore
  • System Claims
    • Valid: Rader, Moore, Linn, O’Malley, and Newman
    • Invalid: Lourie, Dyk, Prost, Reyna, and Wallach

J. Lourie: All  Claims Not Patent-Eligible

Method claims. Claim 33 of the ‘479 patent was a representative method claim:

A method of exchanging obligations as between parties, each party holding a credit record and a debit record with an exchange institution, the credit records and debit records for exchange of predetermined obligations, the method comprising the steps of:

(a) creating a shadow credit record and a shadow debit record for each stakeholder party to be held independently by a supervisory institution from the exchange institutions;

(b) obtaining from each exchange institution a start-of-day balance for each shadow credit record and shadow debit record;

(c) for every transaction resulting in an exchange obligation, the supervisory institution adjusting each respective party’s shadow credit record or shadow debit record, allowing only these transactions that do not result in the value of the shadow debit record being less than the value of the shadow credit record at any time, each said adjustment taking place in chronological order; and

(d) at the end-of-day, the supervisory institution instructing ones of the exchange institutions to exchange credits or debits to the credit record and debit record of the respective parties in accordance with the adjustments of the said permitted transactions, the credits and debits being irrevocable, time invariant obligations placed on the exchange institutions.

J. Lourie, joined by J. Prost, Reyna, and Wallach,  found this claim describes the concept of reducing settlement risk by facilitating a trade through a third party, which is an abstract idea. Then the issue was whether the claim adds “significantly more” to the abstract idea. J. Lourie found that none of the limitations in the claim added anything of substance to the claim beyond the abstract idea.

J. Lourie found that the computer limitation (the parties agreed that claim 33 required a computer) was nothing more than an “insignficant post solution activity.” J. Lourie stated that “At its most basic, a computer is just a calculator capable of performing mental steps faster than a human could.”  J. Lourie continued, “Unless the claims require a computer to perform operations that are not merely accelerated calculations, a computer does not itself confer patent ability.”

Computer-Readable Medium Claims. Claim 39 is a representative computer-readable medium claim, partly reproduced below:

39. A computer program product comprising a computer readable storage medium having computer readable program code embodied in the medium for use by a party to exchange an obligation between a first party and a second party, the computer program product comprising:

program code for causing a computer to send a transaction from said first party relating to an exchange obligation arising from a currency exchange transaction between said first party and said second party; and

program code for causing a computer to allow viewing of information relating to processing, by a supervisory institution…

By looking passed “drafting formalities” J. Lourie found that claim 39 was not truly drawn to a specific computer readable medium, rather than the underling method of reducing settlement risk using a third party intermediary. Therefore, J. Lourie would find the medium claims ineligible.

System Claims. Claim 1 of the ‘720 patent is a representative of the contested system claims, partly reproduced below:

1. A data processing system to enable the exchange of an obligation between parties, the system comprising:

a data storage unit having stored therein information about a shadow credit record and shadow debit record for a party, independent from a credit record and debit record maintained by an exchange institution; and

a computer, coupled to said data storage unit, that is configured to (a) receive a transaction; (b) electronically adjust said shadow credit record and/or said shadow debit records…

J. Lourie asserted that the computer-based limitations recited in the system claims cannot support any meaningful distinction from the computer-based limitations that failed to supply an “inventive concept” to the related method claims. J. Lourie asserted that the system claims recited a handful of computer components in generic, functional terms that would encompass any device capable of performing the same ubiquitous calculations, storage, and connectivity functions required by the method claims.

J. Lourie stated that “No question should have arisen concerning the eligibility of claim to basic computer hardware under 101 when such devices were first invented.” The judge further stated, “But we are living and judging now . . . and have before us not the patent eligibility of specific types of computer or computer components, but computers that have routinely been adapted by software consisting of abstract ideas, and claimed as such, to do all sorts of tasks that formerly were performed by humans.”  Further the judge stated, “Abstract methods do not become patent-eligible machines by being clothed in computer language.”

Rader Opinion: System Claims Not Abstract

The opinion by C.J. Rader, J. Linn, Moore, O’Malley (the “Rader Opinion”), noted that “any claim can be stripped down, simplified, generalized, or paragraphed to remove all of its concrete limitations, until at its core, something that could be characterized as an abstract is revealed.” “Such an approach would ‘if carried to its extreme, make all inventions unpatentable because all inventions can be reduced to underlying principles of nature  which, once known, make their implementations obvious. ” Further, “A court cannot go hunting for abstractions by ignoring the concrete, palpable, tangible limitations of the invention the patentee actually claims.”

The Rader Opinion concluded that “where the claim is tied to a computer in such a way that the computer plays a meaningful role in the performance of the claimed invention, and the claim does not preempt virtually all uses of the underlying abstract idea, the claim is patent eligible.” The Rader Opinion found the system claims patent eligible noting that there were four separate structural components in the system claims: a computer, a first party device, a data storage unit, and a communications controller. The specification provided tat the core of the system hardware is a collection of data processing units” so that the structural and functional limitations were not mere conventional post-solution activities. The Rader Opinion concluded that labeling the claimed system an abstract concept “wrenches all meaning from those words, and turns a narrow exception into one which may swallow the expansive rule.

The Part VI of Rader Opinion joined by only J. Moore, found that the method and medium claims were not patent eligible.

J. Moore: The Death of Technology Patents Under J. Lourie’s View

J. Lourie’s view has broad negative implications for protecting software and technological inventions. As noted in Judge Moore’s opinion,  “If all of these claims, including the system claims are not patent-eligible, this case is the death of hundreds of thousands of patents, including all business method, financial system, and software patents as well as many computer implemented and telecommunications patents.” Moore noted that if all the claims at issue in CLS Bank were invalid then “so too are the 320,799 patents which were granted from 1998-2011 in the technology area ‘Electrical Computers, Digital Processing Systems, Information Security, Error/Fault Handling.'” In J. Moore’s view “if the reasoning of Judge Lourie’s opinion were adopted it would decimate the electronics and software industries.” Moore Op. at 2, note 1.

J. Moore noted that in In re Alappat, 33 F. 3d 1526, the court held patent-eligible a claim that would read on a general purpose computer programmed to carry out the operations recited in the claims. On page 8 and 9 of the slip opinion, J. Moore correctly noted that the distinction between hardware and software is not helpful as programs written in software could also be hard-programed in hardware. J. Moore stated software effectively “rewires a computer, making it a special purpose device capable of performing operations it was not previously able to perform.”

J.Moore noted that if the system claims in this case did not clear the 101 hurdle, “then the abstract idea exception will be insurmountable bar for innovators of software financial systems and business methods, as well as for those in the telecommunications field.” J. Moore stated:

“Every software patent makes a computer perform different functions–that is the purpose of software. Each Software program creates a special purpose machine, a machine which did not previously exists (assuming the software is novel). The machine ceases to be a general purpose computer when it is running the software. It does not, however, by virtue of the software it is running, become an abstract idea.”

J.Moore provided that the heavy lifting for considering the inventiveness of such systems claims directed at a computer running specific software is not abstractness under section 101 but rather is the novelty (newness) requirement of section 102 and the non-obviousness requirement of section 103. Section 102 and 103 can handle knocking out patents directed to inventions that merely take a known or abstract idea and put it on a computer.

 J. Linn’s Opinion: All Claims Patent Eligible under the District Court’s Construction

J. Linn and O’Malley (the Linn opinion) would have found all the method, medium, and system claims patent eligible. The J. Linn opinion noted that because of the procedural stage of the case, the parties and the trial court agreed that the claims should be construed in Alice’s favor and that the method and medium claims required a computer. Therefore the Linn Opinion would have found all the claims as construed by the district court to be patent eligible.

Further the Linn Opinion acknowledged the concerns expressed by Amici Curiae: Google, Dell, Facebook, Intuit, Rackspace, Red Hat, Zynga and Internet retailers regarding the proliferation and aggressive enforcement of low quality software patents.  However, J. Linn noted that Congress could make changes in the law, but broadening what is a narrow exception to the statutory definition of patent eligible should not be the vehicle to address the concerns through the courts.

J. Newman: Section 101 is a Course Filter – All Claims Patent Eligible

J. Newman would have found all claims patent eligible. Newman’s opinion set forth three principles: (1) section 101 is an inclusive statement of patent-eligible subject matter, (2) the form of the claim does not determine section 101 eligibility, and (3) experimental use of patented information is not barred.  Newman stated that there is no need for an all purpose definition of “abstractness” or “preemption” as was “heroically” attempted in the various opinions. Newman wants a very broad section 101 interpretation that would let the other provisions of the patent act do the work in determining patentability such as novelty, utility, prior art, obviousness, description enablement.

Conclusions

C.J. Rader, J. Linn, and J. Moore’s views are the best approach to section 101 patent eligible subject matter regarding system claims. When a claim includes computer or electronic elements that are more than mere post solution activities, those are specific tangible items that cannot reasonably be said to be “abstract.” As for J. Lourie’s opinion providing the view to get to the  gist of the claim, that is a slippery slope and there is no principled way to distinguish when to ignore tangible components of a claim to get to the gist of the underlying claim and when those tangible components should not be ignored.  Every claim term should be considered.

Further, J. Linn is correct that the concerns regarding low quality patents are not best remedied a broad judicially created “abstractness” exception that interprets system claims with integral tangible components as abstract. The issues regarding technology patents should be handled by Congress or through other patent requirements regarding novelty (102) and non-obviousness (103).  As noted in several opinions, every claim can be reduced to an abstract concept by stripping away the details and components. However, if such an approach is taken, the exception could expand to swallow the patentability of all inventions.

 Practice Tip

In view of this decision, patent applications directed to software or were the invention utilizes software should include at least one set of system claims because, of all the claim types of Alice patents, the system claims garnered the most support from judges regarding patent eligibility.

 

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Real Estate Software Patent: User Action Steps Prevent Direct Infringement

US5032989Fig3Move, Inc. v. Real Estate Alliance Ltd., Dkt. No. 2012-1342 (Fed. Cir. March 4, 2013)

Move sought declaratory judgement of non-infringement of two of Real’s patents, U.S. 5,032,989 and U.S. 4,870,576. Real counterclaimed  that Move’s “Search by Map” and “Search by Zip Code” website functions infringed the patents. The district court issued summary judgement of non-infringement.

Claim 1 of the ‘989 patent was at issue on appeal and was directed to a method for locating real estate properties using a zoom enabled map on a computer. Claim 1 provided:

1. A method using a computer for locating available real estate properties comprising the steps of:

(a) creating a database of the available real estate properties;
(b) displaying a map of a desired geographic area;
(c) selecting a first area having boundaries within the geographic area;
(d) zooming in on the first area of the displayed map to about the boundaries of the first area to display a higher level of detail than the displayed map;
(e) displaying the first zoomed area;
(f) selecting a second area having boundaries within the first zoomed area;
(g) displaying the second area and a plurality of points within the second area, each point representing the appropriate geographic location of an available real estate property; and
(h) identifying available real estate properties within the database which are located within the second area.

Direct Infringement. In a prior appeal the Federal circuit determined that “selecting an area” as recited in steps (c) and (f) of claim 1 meant that “the user or a computer chooses an area having boundaries, not when the computer updates certain display variables to reflect the selected area.”

The Move system allowed the user to select a predefined area, such as a city, and the system would then zoom into the map according to the predefined boundaries of the area. The court found that the system did not “select an area having boundaries” by showing the predefined area after a user selected the area. Rather the computer just retrieved the map associated with the user’s choice. Therefore Move did not directly carry out the (c) and (f) steps of the claim.

Since Move did not directly carry out all of the steps, it must have direct or control over the performance of the missing steps by another party to be liable for direct infringement. The court found that it did not exert the required direction or control over its users to be liable for direct infringement.

Indirect infringement. The Federal Circuit found that the district court did not conduct the required analysis as to whether Move could be liable for inducing infringement by inducing its users to perform the claimed steps that Move did not itself perform.

Claim Language Suggestions. To allow for direct infringement, the claims could have been worded differently. Assuming the following was supported by the specification and permissible by the prior art, step (c) could have provided “receiving from a user a selection of a first area having boundaries within the geographic area” and step (f) could have provided “receiving from a user a selection of a second area having boundaries within the first zoomed area.” Such language might provide a better case for direct infringement.

[gview file=”http://www.waltmire.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/FedCir_Move_v_Real_2012-1342.pdf”]

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New Manifestly Evident Test Maintains Broad View of Patent Eligible Subject Matter

CLS Bank International v. Alice Corporation, Dkt No. 2011-1301 (Fed Cir. July 9, 2012) [11-1301 Opinion]. 

CLS sued Alice for declaratory judgement that  U.S. Patent No. 5,970,479, 6,912,510, 7,149,720, and 7,725,375 owned by Alice were invalid, unenforceable, or otherwise not infringed. The district court held that each of Alice’ s patents were invalid under section 101 for failure to claim patent eligible subject matter. The Federal Circuit reversed maintaining a broad view of patentable subject matter.

Representative Claim 33 of the ‘497 patent provides: A method of exchanging obligations as between parties, each party holding a credit record and a debit record with an exchange institution, the credit records and debit records for exchange of predetermined obligations, the method comprising the steps of:

(a) creating a shadow credit record and a shadow debit record for each stakeholder party to be held independently by a supervisory institution from the exchange institutions;

(b) obtaining from each exchange institution a start-of-day balance for each shadow credit record and shadow debit record;

(c) for every transaction resulting in an exchange obligation, the supervisory institution adjusting each respective party’s shadow credit record or shadow debit record, allowing only these [sic] transactions that do not result in the value of the shadow debit record being less than the value of the shadow credit record at any time, each said adjustment taking place in chronological order; and

(d) at the end-of-day, the supervisory institution instructing one of the exchange institutions to exchange credits or debits to the credit record and debit record of the respective parties in accordance with the adjustments of the said permitted transactions, the credits and debits being irrevocable, time invariant obligations placed on the exchange institutions.

Manifestly Evident Test.The Federal Circuit found that the district court took too narrow a view of patent eligible subject matter . The Federal Circuit introduced a new manifestly evident test which provides, “when–after taking all the claim recitations into consideration–t is not manifestly evident that the claim is directed to a patent ineligible abstract idea, that claim must not be deemed for that reason to be inadequate under  § 101.” The court continued, “It would undermine the intent of Congress to extend a judicially-crafted exception to the unqualified statutory eligibility criteria of § 101 beyond that which is ‘implicitly’ excluded as a ‘fundamental truth’ that is ‘free to all mend and reserved exclusively to none.’ ” (citing Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010)).  The court further stated that “Unless the single most reasonable understanding is that a claim is directed to nothing more than a fundamental truth or disembodied concept, with no limitations in the claim attaching the idea to a specific application, it is inappropriate to hold the claim is directed to patent ineligible ‘abstract idea’ under 35 U.S.C. § 101.”

The Federal Circuit found that the claims of the ‘720 and the ‘375 Patents each had explicit machine limitations. ’720 Patent col.65 ll.42- 48 (“A data processing system . . . comprising a data  storage unit . . . ; and a computer . . . .”); ’375 Patent col.68 ll.5-7 (“A computer program product comprising a computer readable storage medium having computer readable program code embodied in the medium . . . .”). The court found these machine limitations could not be ignored and they were not “insignificant post solution activity.”

Electronic Adjustment Implicates a Machine. Regarding the method claims of the ‘510 patent, the Federal Circuit found that they each provided an “electronic adjustment” limitation, which implicated a machine under the machine-or-transformation test.  The court noted that the CLS agreed that the electronic adjustment required a computer, which was consistent with the patent specification.

Shadow Credit Record Implicates a Machine. Regarding the method claim of the ‘479 patent recited above, the court noted that the claims did not have the “electronic adjustment” limitation, but the claims did contain a “shadow credit record” and a “shadow debit record”, which when read in light of the specification, required a computer implementation. As a result the “shadow credit record” and “shadow debit record” where sufficient to implicate a machine under the machine under the machine-or-transformation test.

The court acknowledged that the mere fact of a computer implementation alone does not resolve the patent eligibility question. The court stated that it was not computer implementation, but the claims as a whole that make the invention patentable.

Dissent. Judge Prost criticized the majority’s manifestly evident test. The dissent asserted that the claims were merely directed to the basic idea of using an intermediary in a financial transaction, which the dissent noted existed since the Early Roman Empire. The dissent asserted that the representative claim 33 of the ‘479 patent involves four simple steps: (a) creating a debit and credit account for each party, (b) checking  the account balances in the morning, (c) adjusting the account balances through the day, and (d) paying the parties at the end of the day if both parties have performed. The dissent dismissed any patentable significance being attached to “shadow records.” The dissent asserted that shadow records are simply used to define an account that is used to ptrack a party’s payments and that any financial intermediation would do this.

The Dissent further noted that the invention is focused on the financial transaction and not the computer implementation. The dissent noted that the ‘disclosure of the invention” section of  the ‘720 Patent almost exclusively discusses the concept of risk minimization in financial transactions. There are no statements that the computer implementation is an advancement in the art and instead provides that the object of the invention can be “achieved by a computing/telecommunications infrastructure that is capable of being accessed worldwide by any enterprise/individual having access to a computer and a telephone network.” The dissent asserts that the rest of the specification is devoid of any teaching for how one implements computer systems.

Focus on Whether Inventive Aspects are Abstract. The Dissent asserts that “we must look beyond the non-inventive aspects of the claims and ask whether the remaining portion is and abstract idea.”

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“For” Interpreted as Must Perform v. Capable of Performing

Typhoon Touch v. Dell Inc., et al., Dkt. No. 2009-1589 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 4, 2011).

Typhoon sued Dell, Lenovo, San Due Ventures, Toshiba, Fujitsu, Panasonic, Apple, and HTC alleging infringement of US Pat. Nos. 5,379,057 and 5,675,362, each patent directed to a portable computer with touch screen. The appeals court reviewed the district courts finding of non-infringement and invalidity.

Claim 12 of the ‘057 patent is a representative claim, with terms in dispute emphasized:

A portable, keyboardless, computer comprising:

an input/output device for displaying inquiries on a touch-sensitive screen, said screen configured for entry of responses to said inquiries;

a memory for storing at least one data collection application configured to determine contents and formats of said inquiries displayed on said screen;

a processor coupled to said memory and said in-put/output device for executing said data collection application; and

an application generator for generating said data collection application and for creating different functional libraries relating to said contents and said formats displayed on said screen, said applica-tion generator further comprising means for cross-referencing responses to said inquiries with possible responses from one of said libraries; and

a run-time utility operating in conjunction with said processor to execute said application and said libraries to facilitate data collection operations.

Must Perform v. Capable of Performing. Typhoon argued that the district court erred in construing the claim term “a memory for storing at least one data collection application configured to determine contents and formats of said inquiries displayed on said screen.” The district court found that the memory must perform the recited function.  Typhoon argued the district court was wrong and that an infringing device need only be capable of performing the recited function.  In other words, as long as the memory is capable  of being configured to (e.g. programmed to) store the data collection application, even if the memory is not so configured, the element is satisfied.

The Federal Circuit reviewed prior cases and noted that  “capable of” did not mean “might be later modified to perform that function.” It said that infringement may not be based on “a finding that an accused product is merely capable of being modified in a manner that infringes the claims of a patent.” Further the specification supported the district court’s construction.

Algorithm Adequately Disclosed. The district court found the term means for cross-referencing responses to said inquiries with possible responses from one of said libraries” was indefinite because the specification failed to adequately provide an algorithm for carrying out the means element.  The court noted that “a means-plus-function term is impermissibly indefinite under §112 ¶ 2 when the specification “simply describes the function to be performed, not the algorithm by which it is performed.”

The court provided that an algorithm in computer systems encompasses “in essence a series of instructions for the computer to follow” whether in mathematical formula, or a word description of the procedure, or shown in a flow chart. The court also observed that “[t]he preferred definition of ‘algorithm’ in the computer art is: ‘A fixed step-by-step procedure for accom-plishing a given result; usually a simplified procedure for solving a complex problem, also a full statement of a finite number of steps.’”

The court review the specification of the patents at issue and found that the following excerpt of the specifcation sufficiently disclosed an algorithm:

Cross-Referencing imports that, for each answer field, the entered response can be related to a library to determine if the response in the answer field is existent in the library. In other words, the answer information is cross-referenced against that specific library. If it is available in that library, then, corresponding to that library entry, an action is executed. For instance, the associated action can involve an overlay window that alerts the user of the fact of the match with the library entry, or dis-plays the contents of an information field stored in association with that entry in the memory.

The court affirmed on the issue of non-infringement and reversed on the issue of invalidity.

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Sufficient Computer Structure Disclosure for Means-Plus-Function Elements

HTC Corp v. IPCom GMBH, Dkt. No. 2011-1004 (Fed. Cir. Jan 30, 2012) [PDF].

HTC sue IPcom for declaratory judgement of non-infringement of IPCom’s Patents, including U.S. Pat. No. 6,879,830 and IPCom countersued for infringement. The ‘830 patent is directed to the handover of a cellular phone from one base (tower) to another, as for example, when a person uses a cell phone in a car traveling between coverage areas.  The invention is intended to reduce the chance of service interruption during the handover.

Claim 1 provides:

A mobile station for use with a network including a first base station and a second base station that achieves a handover from the first base station to the second base station by:

storing link data for a link in a first base station,

holding in reserve for the link resources of the first base station, and

when the link is to be handed over to the sec-ond base station:

initially maintaining a storage of the link data in the first base station,

initially causing the resources of the first base station to remain held in reserve, and

at a later timepoint determined by a fixed pe-riod of time predefined at a beginning of the handover, deleting the link data from the first base station and freeing up the resources of the first base station, the mobile station comprising:

an arrangement for reactivating the link with the first base station if the handover is unsuc-cessful.

At summary judgement, HTC claimed that claims 1 and 18 (similar to claim 1), were invalid as indefinite because (1) they claimed both an apparatus and method steps and (2) the patent failed to disclose structure corresponding to the claimed means-plus-function element “arrangement for reactivating.”

Over Emphasis on Prosecution History. While the district court found the claims invalid because they claimed both apparatus and method steps, the Federal Circuit disagreed.  The Federal Circuit found the claim was an apparatus claim directed to a moble station (cellular phone) to be used within a network. In interpreting the claim language the Federal Circuit considered factors set out in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc): (1) the words of the claim, (2) the specification, (3) the prosecution history, and (4) extrinsic evidence. The Federal Circuit found that the district court put too much emphasis on the prosecution history. The patentee in response to an office action stated, “the cited section of [the prior art reference] clearly describes a process that is completely different from the claimed process. . .” (emphasis added). The Federal Circuit  noted that “claim language and the specification generally carry greater weight than the prosecution history.” The court found that the attorney’s signle reference to a “process” in response to an office action was insufficient when viewed in relation to the plain language of the claims and specification.

Sufficient Computer Structure. The Federal Circuit found that the district court erred in finding that the disclosure of a processor and transceiver was sufficient structure. The Federal Circuit noted that when considering whether their is sufficient support in the specification for a means-plus-function limitation, the disclosure of a general purpose computer or micro processor is not enough. Instead an algorithm must also be disclosed which the computer/processor executes. A patent must disclose “a means for achieving a particular outcome, not merely the outcome itself.” Yet, the appellate court found HTC waived any argument regarding whether the ‘830 patent disclosed a sufficient algorithm.

Further, the Federal Circuit rejected HTC’s argument that the specification needed to disclose the precise circuitry, components, or schematics or controllers would be employed. The court provided that level of hardware disclosure is not necessary, stating “as long as a sufficient algorithm describing how a general-purpose computer will perform the function is disclosed, reference to such general-purpose processors will suffice to overcome an indefiniteness challenge.”

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Method of Monetizing Copyrighted Content on Internet is Patent-Eligible

Ultramercial v. Hulu and Wildtangent, Dkt. No. 2010-1544 (Fed. Cir. Sept 15, 2011) [PDF].

Update: WildTangent appealed to U.S. Supreme Court and The Court vacated the Federal Circuit’s decision discussed below and remanded the case the Federal Circuit to consider in light of Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U. S. ___ (2012).

Second Update: On remand from the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit again found that the claimed method of monetizing copyrighted content on the Internet was a patent-eligible process.

Ultramercial sued Hulu, YouTube, and Wildtangent Inc. alleging each infringed U.S. Patent 7,346,545. Hulu and YouTube were dismissed from the case. The trial court granted WildTangent’s motion to dismiss WildTangent from the case on the basis that the ‘545 patent did not claim patent-eligible subject matter. The Federal Circuit reversed finding the claimed method of monetizing copyrighted content on the Internet was a patent-eligible process.

The ‘545 patent claims a method for distributing copyrighted products over the Internet where a consumer receives a copyrighted product for free after viewing an advertisement. The advertiser pays for the copyrighted content. Claim 1 of the ‘545 patent provides:

A method for distribution of products over the Internet via a facilitator, said method comprising the steps of:

a first step of receiving, from a content provider, media products that are covered by intellectual-property rights protection and are available for purchase, wherein each said media product being comprised of at least one of text data, music data, and video data;

a second step of selecting a sponsor message to be associated with the media product, said sponsor message being selected from a plurality of sponsor messages, said second step including accessing an activity log to verify that the total number of times which the sponsor message has been previously presented is less than the number of transaction cycles contracted by the sponsor of the sponsor message;

a third step of providing the media product for sale at an Internet website;

a fourth step of restricting general public access to said media product;

a fifth step of offering to a consumer access to the media product without charge to the consumer on the precondition that the consumer views the sponsor message;

a sixth step of receiving from the consumer a request to view the sponsor message, wherein the consumer submits said request in response to being offered access to the media product;

a seventh step of, in response to receiving the request from the consumer, facilitating the display of a sponsor message to the consumer;

an eighth step of, if the sponsor message is not an interactive message, allowing said consumer access to said media product after said step of facilitating the display of said sponsor message;

a ninth step of, if the sponsor message is an interactive message, presenting at least one query to the consumer and allowing said consumer access to said media product after receiving a response to said at least one query;

a tenth step of recording the transaction event to the activity log, said tenth step including updating the total number of times the sponsor message has been presented; and

an eleventh step of receiving payment from the sponsor of the sponsor message displayed.

Patent-Eligible Subject Matter. Section 101 of the Patent Act provides that any new process, machine, article of manufacture, and composition of matter is patent eligible subject matter. Three areas excluded from patent eligibility are laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas. The Supreme Court has previously stated that a process under section 101 can include a business method. Further, while abstract principles are not patentable, an application of an abstract idea may be patentable.

Monetizing Content via Internet was a “Process” under the Statute. The Federal Circuit court found that the claimed method of monetizing and distributing copyrighted products over the Internet was a “process” under the patent statute and was therefore patent-eligible subject matter. The court turned its focus on whether the claimed subject matter was not patent eligible as being and abstract idea.

The Claimed Process was Not An Abstract Idea. The court stated, “[I]nventions with specific applications or improvements to technologies in the marketplace are not likely to be so abstract that they override the statutory language and framework of the Patent Act.” The court found that the ‘545 patent sought to fix the problem of declining click-through rates of banner advertising by introducing a method of distribution that caused consumers to view advertisements before granting access to the desired media such as video.

The court found that the claimed invention of the ‘545 patent was an application of an idea and not an abstract idea itself. The court termed the abstract idea as the idea that advertising can be used as a form of currency. Then the court noted that the patent disclosed a practical application of this idea. The court supported its conclusion by noting that the steps of the method are “likely to require intricate and complex computer programming” and that certain steps “require specific application to the Internet and a cyber-market environment” such as “providing said media products for sale on an Internet website.” It further noted that the invention would involve a “extensive computer interface.”

The court noted that the fact that the ‘545 patent did not specify a particular way (e.g. FTP, email, streaming) for delivering the media content to the consumer did not render the claimed subject matter impermissibly abstract. In addition, as the claim provided a controlled interaction via a website with a customer, the claim did not comprise only purely mental steps.

No Bright Line Rule. However, the court refused to specify a minimum level of programming complexity required so that a computer-implemented method is patent-eligible. Further, the court cautioned that not every use of an Internet website in a method will be sufficient alone to find that method patent-eligible.